The McCain-Turner semantics of causal rules is based on a xpoint construction similar to the one found in the de nition of default logic. In the special case when the heads of the rules are literals, it can be equivalently expressed by a translation from sets of rules into sets of propositional formulas. In this note, we de ne a translation from causal logic into classical logic that characterizes the semantics of arbitrary causal rules, without any restrictions on their syntactic form. This translation suggests a way to extend the McCain-Turner logic to nonpropositional causal theories.
Introduction
The nonmonotonic logic of causal explanation proposed by Norman McCain and Hudson Turner 1997a] provides a simple and powerful formalism for representing properties of actions. Their work builds on the analysis of causality due to Hector Ge ner 1990], on work by Fangzhen Lin 1995] and on their own research described in McCain and Turner, 1995] . The main idea of this theory is to distinguish between the claim that a proposition is true and the stronger claim that there is a cause for it to be true. Causal dependencies are described by \causal rules" of the form F G (1) where F and G are propositional formulas. 1 Rule (1) expresses that F has a cause if G is true, or that G provides a \causal explanation" for F.
The de nition of the semantics of causal rules (reproduced in Section 7 below) uses a xpoint construction similar to the one familiar from the de nition of an extension in default logic Reiter, 1980] . In the special case when the heads of the rules are literals, the semantics can be equivalently expressed by a translation from sets of rules into sets of propositional formulas. This translation, called \literal completion," is similar to the completion process used in logic programming Clark, 1978] . In McCain and Turner, 1 The syntax used in McCain and Turner, 1997a ] is G ) F. 1997b], literal completion is used to apply satis ability planning Kautz and Selman, 1992 ] to action domains described by causal theories.
In this note, we de ne a translation from causal logic into classical logic that characterizes the semantics of arbitrary causal rules, without any restrictions on their syntactic form. This translation opens the possibility of applying satis ability planning to causal theories with arbitrary formulas in the heads of rules. Furthermore, the new approach to the semantics of causal theories suggests a way to extend the McCain-Turner de nition to nonpropositional rules. The treatment of free variables in nonmonotonic formalisms de ned by xpoint conditions is a notoriously di cult problem, 2 and the use of a translational semantics is crucial for overcoming this di culty. This extension of the McCainTurner system allows us to describe causal dependencies in the domains characterized by nonpropositional theories. In the new framework, large (or even in nite) propositional causal theories can be sometimes replaced by compact nonpropositional representations.
The translation that we propose may introduce second-order quanti ers, but in many cases of interest these quanti ers can be eliminated. 3 An elimination process leads, in particular, to an extension of the process of literal completion to nonpropositional causal theories.
The McCain-Turner semantics is based on the idea that a causal theory should \ex-plain" the truth value of every propositional symbol in its language. They characterize this \principle of universal causation" as a rather strong philosophical commitment that is rewarded by the mathematical simplicity of the theory. In the modi cation described below, we distinguish between \explainable" symbols|those whose values must be causally explained by the given rules|and \nonexplainable" ones.
The formulation of causal logic presented in this note serves as the basis of a new action language in the style of Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1993] , in which the concurrent execution of actions can be described, and both actions and uents can be represented by expressions with parameters. This is the subject of a forthcoming paper.
The de nition and examples of nonpropositional causal theories are discussed in the next two sections. In Section 4 we show how the e ects of actions over an in nite set of time instants can be described by a nite collection of causal rules with variables. A nonpropositional version of literal completion is introduced in Section 5, and its correctness is proved in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we show that the McCain-Turner semantics of causal rules is indeed equivalent to a special case of the semantics proposed in this note. It is known, for instance, that the semantics of open defaults proposed in Reiter, 1980] leads to serious di culties Baader and Hollunder, 1995] .
Causal Theories
Consider any language of classical logic (propositional, rst-order or higher-order, possibly many-sorted). A causal rule is an expression of form (1) Note that the occurrences of explainable symbols in the heads are replaced here by variables, and the occurrences in the bodies are not. We will view T as shorthand for the sentence 8e(T (e) e = E):
(The expression e = E stands for the conjunction of the equalities between the members of e and the corresponding members of E.) For instance, by a model of T we mean a model of (2); a theorem of T is a sentence that is entailed by (2). Intuitively, the condition T (e) expresses that the possible values e of the explainable symbols E are \explained" by the rules of T. Sentence (2) says that the actual values of these symbols are the only ones that are explained by the rules of T.
4
A nonlogical constant is a function constant or a predicate constant (other than equality). This includes, in particular, object constants (function constants of arity 0) and propositional constants (predicate constants of arity 0).
5
The similarity condition means that (i) e has the same length as E, (ii) if the k-th member of E is a function constant then the k-th member of e is a function variable of the same type, and (iii) if the k-th member of E is a predicate constant then the k-th member of e is a predicate variable of the same type. Formula (2) can be equivalently written as T (E)^8e(T (e) e = E):
In this expression, the term T (E) is the conjunction of the universal closures of the implications G i (E; x i ) F i (E; x i ) corresponding to the rules of T.
3 Examples Example 1. The only causal rule of T is P(x) Q(x); (4) where P and Q are unary predicate constants, and P is explainable. Then T (p) is 8x(Q(x) p(x)); where p is a unary predicate variable, and (2) 
It is easy to check that this second-order formula is equivalent to
What is the intuitive meaning of this result? Since the predicate constant P is declared explainable, the value of P at every point x should be \explained" by the causal rules of T. The only rule of T explains P(x), but it does not explain :P(x). So all values of P can be explained only if P is identically true. Furthermore, this rule explains P(x) only for the values of x that satisfy Q. So all values of P can be explained only if Q is identically true as well.
Example 2. The causal rules of T are (4) and :P(x) :P(x); (6) where P and Q are as in Example
and (2) becomes 8pf 8x(Q(x) p(x))^8x(:P(x) :p(x))] p = Pg:
Proposition 1 below shows that this causal theory is equivalent to 8x(P(x) Q(x)):
Intuitively, rule (6) says that, whenever P is false at a point x, there is a cause for this.
If this rule is included in a causal theory then the other rules should allow us to explain every case when P is true. Since Q(x) is the only possible explanation for P(x), P turns out to be equivalent to Q.
Note that (5) is a theorem of the theory from Example 1, but not a theorem of the theory obtained from it by adding rule (6). This fact illustrates the nonmonotonic character of causal theories. The nonmonotonicity of the formalism is not surprising, because the formulas representing the rules of T occur negatively in the second conjunctive term of (3). This term is similar, in this sense, to the minimality condition in the de nition of circumscription.
Including rule (6) in a causal theory is similar to postulating that P is \false by default," or, in other words, to circumscribing P. The following proposition makes this precise: Proposition 1. A causal theory of the form
(1 i m); :P(x) :P(x); where P is the only explainable symbol of the theory and x is a tuple of distinct variables, is equivalent to the circumscription of P in V m i=1 e 8F i . 6
To apply this proposition to Example 2, observe rst that (4) can be rewritten as
without changing the formula T (p). It follows that the causal theory of Example 2 is equivalent to the circumscription of P in 8x(Q(x) P(x)), that is, to (7). Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the given causal theory by T, and let F(P) stand for V m i=1 e 8F i . Then
(for notation, see Lifschitz, 1994] , Section 2.1), and consequently
Examples 1 and 2 are di erent from causal theories in the sense of McCain and Turner, 1997a] in two ways. First, they are nonpropositional. Second, in these examples we distinguish between the explainable symbols (P) and the nonexplainable symbols (Q); as pointed out in the introduction, McCain and Turner require a causal explanation for every symbol. Technically, the availability of nonexplainable symbols in our version of the theory is not very essential: Reclassifying a predicate constant Q as explainable could be neutralized by adding the causal rules Q(x) Q(x); :Q(x) :Q(x); (8) which say that, whatever the truth value of Q(x) is, there is a cause for this formula to have that value. More precisely:
Proposition 2. Let T be a causal theory containing rules (8), where Q is an explainable predicate constant and x is a tuple of distinct variables. The causal theory obtained from T by deleting Q from the set of explainable symbols and dropping rules (8) is equivalent to T.
For instance, the causal theory whose rules are P(x) Q(x); :P(x) :P(x); Q(x) Q(x); :Q(x) :Q(x); (9) where both P and Q are explainable, is equivalent to the theory of Example 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let E be the list of all explainable symbols other than Q, and let T 1 be the causal theory obtained from T by deleting Q from the set of explainable symbols and dropping rules (8). Then T T (E; Q)^8eq(T (e; q) (e = E^q = Q)) T 1 (E; Q)^8eq (T 1 (e; q)^8x(Q(x) q(x))^8x(:Q(x) :q(x))) (e = E^q = Q)] T 1 (E; Q)^8eq((T 1 (e; q)^q = Q) (e = E^q = Q)) T 1 (E; Q)^8e(T 1 (e; Q) e = E) T 1 :
4 Describing Actions by Causal Rules Example 2 has a simple interpretation in terms of actions and their e ects. Imagine that Q(x) represents an action (more precisely, the assertion that a certain action is executed during a particular interval of time), and that P(x) represents a uent (more precisely, the assertion that a certain truth-valued uent holds after performing the action). Then rule (4) tells us that, after performing the action, there is a cause for the uent to hold. Rule (6) expresses that this uent is \false by default"|that it is \momentary" in the sense of Lifschitz and Rabinov, 1989 ].
This interpretation is appropriate, for instance, if Q(x) represents plucking string x on the guitar, and P(x) means that string x sounds. Conclusion (7), sanctioned by the semantics of causal rules introduced above, re ects the commonsense fact that a string sounds if and only if it has just been plucked. This applies, in particular, to the case when Q(x) holds for more than one value of x, that is, when several strings are plucked simultaneously.
The next example di ers from Example 2 in two ways. First, instead of momentary uents, we consider uents governed by the commonsense law of inertia. Second, instead of considering the e ect of a single action, we trace the evolution of the uents along an in nite sequence of instants of time. The language will include a second sort of variables, for natural numbers, and each of the predicates P, Q will get a second argument of this new sort. We will follow the style of formalization proposed in McCain and Turner, 1997a] , except that the availability of variables will allow us to replace an in nite set of axioms by a nite one.
Example 3. The causal rules of T are n 0 6 = 0 ; m 0 = n 0 m = n ; p(0)^8m(p(m) p(m 0 )) p(n) ; P(x; n 0 ) Q(x; n); P(x; n 0 ) P(x; n)^P(x; n 0 ); :P(x; n 0 ) :P(x; n)^:P(x; n 0 ); P(x; 0) P(x; 0); :P(x; 0) :P(x; 0); and P is explainable. The rst three rules characterize the system of natural numbers by the standard Peano axioms, using the predicate variable p to express induction. The fourth rule describes the e ect of Q on P; P(x; n) expresses that P(x) holds at time n, and Q(x; n) expresses that the action Q(x) is executed between times n and n 0 . The next pair of rules expresses the law of inertia for P by saying that there is a cause for P(x) to be true (false) at time n 0 if it is true (respectively, false) both at time n and at time n 0 . The last two rules are similar to (8); their e ect is to obviate the need to explain the values of P at the initial instant of time.
In the next section we will see that this theory is equivalent to the conjunction of the Peano axioms (that is, the heads of the rst three rules) and the condition P(x; n 0 ) P(x; n) _ Q(x; n): (10) 5 Literal Completion Consider a causal theory T such that every explainable symbol of T is a predicate constant. A causal rule is de nite relative to T if its head is a literal that does not contain explainable symbols of T in argument positions, or does not contain explainable symbols of T. A causal theory T is de nite if every rule of T is a de nite rule.
The causal theories from Examples 1{3 are de nite. The need to have formulas more complex than literals in the heads of causal rules arises, for instance, when an explicitly de ned symbol is added to the language McCain and Turner, 1997a]; a de nitional extension of a causal theory is not de nite.
The process of completion described below turns any de nite causal theory into an equivalent set of sentences of classical logic. If the heads and the bodies of all rules of the theory are rst-order formulas, as in Examples 1 and 2, then the resulting sentences are rst-order also. Moreover, we will see that even in Example 3, where one of the rules includes a predicate variable, completion does not introduce any new higher-order variables and thus leads to a simple result.
The main new feature of literal completion in comparison with the completion process de ned in Clark, 1978] is that the \completed de nition" of a predicate constant P consists of two equivalences, one \positive" and one \negative."
The algorithm takes any de nite causal theory T as input. By P we denote any explainable symbol of T; P stands for P if = 1 and for :P if = ?1. Using this notation, we can write any literal whose predicate symbol is explainable as P (t), where t is a tuple of terms. We perform successively the following steps.
Step 1: For each P, take a tuple of new variables x and replace each rule of the form P (t) G by P (x) (x = t)^G.
Step 2: Replace each rule P (x) G obtained in the previous step by P (x) 9yG, where y are the free variables of the original rule.
Step 3: For each P and each , replace all rules P (x) G i by the rule P (x) _ i G i .
Step 4: For each P and each , replace the rule P (x) G obtained in the previous step by the sentence e 8(P (x) G).
Step 5: Replace each remaining rule F G by the sentence e 8(G F). The sentences obtained in this way are called the completion sentences for T.
Completion Theorem. Every de nite causal theory is equivalent to the conjunction of its completion sentences.
In the examples of literal completion below, we use classical logic to simplify the bodies of the rules after some of the steps. The formulas obtained at the end of this process are logically equivalent to the completion sentences.
Example 1, continued. The result of Step 1 is P(x 1 ) x 1 = x^Q(x):
Step 2 leads to P(x 1 ) 9x(x 1 = x^Q(x)); which can be rewritten as P(x 1 ) Q(x 1 ):
Step 3 adds the second rule :P(x 1 ) False:
Step 4 produces the equivalences 8x 1 (P(x 1 ) Q(x 1 )); 8x 1 (:P(x 1 ) False):
It is clear that the conjunction of these formulas is logically equivalent to (5).
Example 2, continued. After the rst two steps, we get P(x 1 ) Q(x 1 ); :P(x 1 ) :P(x 1 ):
Step 3 does not change these rules, and the result of Step 4 is 8x 1 (P(x 1 ) Q(x 1 )); 8x 1 (:P(x 1 ) :P(x 1 )):
It is clear that the conjunction of these formulas is logically equivalent to (7).
Example 3, continued. After Steps 1 and 2, we get n 0 6 = 0 ; m 0 = n 0 m = n ; p(0)^8m(p(m) p(m 0 )) p(n) ; P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^Q (x 1 ; n)); P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^P (x 1 ; n)^P(x 1 ; n 0 )); :P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^: P(x 1 ; n)^:P(x 1 ; n 0 )); P(x 1 ; m 1 ) m 1 = 0^P(x 1 ; 0); :P(x 1 ; m 1 ) m 1 = 0^:P(x 1 ; 0); and
Step 3 gives n 0 6 = 0 ; m 0 = n 0 m = n ; p(0)^8m(p(m) p(m 0 )) p(n) ; P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^Q (x 1 ; n)) _9n(m 1 = n 0^P (x 1 ; n)^P(x 1 ; n 0 )) _(m 1 = 0^P(x 1 ; 0)); :P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^: P(x 1 ; n)^:P(x 1 ; n 0 )) _(m 1 = 0^:P(x 1 ; 0)):
The completion sentences are PA; 8x 1 m 1 P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^Q (x 1 ; n)) _9n(m 1 = n 0^P (x 1 ; n)^P(x 1 ; n 0 )) _(m 1 = 0^P(x 1 ; 0))]; 8x 1 m 1 :P(x 1 ; m 1 ) 9n(m 1 = n 0^: P(x 1 ; n)^:P(x 1 ; n 0 )) _(m 1 = 0^:P(x 1 ; 0))];
where PA stands for the Peano axioms 8n(n 0 6 = 0); 8mn(m 0 = n 0 m = n);
The fact that every number other than 0 has a unique successor, which is a logical consequence of PA, can be used to rewrite the conjunction of the last two completion sentences as the universal closure of (10).
Proof of the Completion Theorem
The proof of the completion theorem is based on the fact that a de nite theory can be decomposed into \simple" parts. The decomposition process is of interest in its own right, because it can be also used to simplify some theories that are not de nite.
About causal theories T 1 , T 2 with sets E 1 , E 2 of explainable symbols we say that they are disjoint if E 1 and E 2 are disjoint sets, the symbols in E 1 do not occur in the heads of the rules of T 2 , and the symbols in E 2 do not occur in the heads of the rules of T 1 . 
such that P is the only explainable symbol of T, x is a tuple of distinct variables, G 1 (x), G 2 (x) are formulas containing no free variables other than the members of x.
For instance, the theory from Example 2 is simple. It is clear that every simple theory is de nite. The following lemma shows that any simple theory is equivalent to the pair of sentences obtained from it by applying Step 4 of the completion process.
Lemma 2. Any simple theory (11) is equivalent to 8x(P(x) G 1 (x))^8x(:P(x) G 2 (x)):
Proof. For a simple theory (11), sentence (3) turns into 8x(
or, equivalently,
To eliminate the second-order quanti ers in the last two conjunctive terms, observe that these terms can be written as the negations of the sentences
and 9p 8x (G 1 (x) 
The second conjunctive term of (14) contains a negative occurence of p, and the occurrences of p in the other two conjunctive terms are positive. Consequently, (14) is equivalent to 8x(G 1 (x) :G 2 (x))^:8x(:G 2 (x) P(x)):
In the presence of the rst two conjunctive terms of (13), this can be further rewritten as :8x(:G 2 (x) P(x)):
The rst conjunctive term of (15) contains a positive occurence of p, and the occurrences of p in the other two conjunctive terms are negative. Consequently, (15) is equivalent to 8x(G 1 (x) :G 2 (x))^:8x(P(x) G 1 (x)):
In the presence of the rst two conjunctive terms of (13), this can be further rewritten as :8x(P(x) G 1 (x)):
Consequently, (13) is equivalent to 8x(G 1 (x) P(x))^8x(G 2 (x) :P(x))^8x(:G 2 (x) P(x))^8x(P(x) G 1 (x));
which is equivalent to (12).
Proof of the Completion Theorem. Let T be a de nite theory with the explainable symbols P 1 ; : : :; P m , and let T 0 be the theory obtained from T after Steps 1{3 of the completion process. It is easy to see that T 0 is equivalent to T. For each i = 1; : : :; m, let T i be the theory whose rules are the rules of T 0 that contain P i in the head and whose only explainable symbol is P i . Let T m+1 be the theory whose rules are the rules of T 0 that are not included in any of the theories T 1 ; : : :; T m and whose set of explainable symbols is empty. It is clear that the theories T 1 ; : : :; T m ; T m+1 are pairwise disjoint, and that their union is T 0 . By Lemma 1, it follows that T 0 is equivalent to T 1^ ^T m^Tm+1 . Each of the theories T 1 ; : : :; T m is simple. By Lemma 2, it follows that the formula T 1^ ^T m is equivalent to the conjunction of the completion sentences obtained in Step 4. Since the heads of the rules of T m+1 do not include explainable symbols, it follows that T 0 is equivalent to the conjunction of all completion sentences for T.
Relation to the McCain-Turner De nition
The semantics of causal rules according to McCain and Turner, 1997a] can be de ned as follows. Let T be a set of propositional causal rules. For any interpretation I of the language of T, let T I be the set of the heads of all rules of T whose bodies are satis ed by I. We say that I is causally explained according to T if I is the only model of T I . A formula F is a consequence of T if every interpretation that is causally explained according to T satis es F.
Consider, for instance, the propositional counterpart of rules (9): P Q; :P :P; Q Q; :Q :Q:
For the interpretation I that makes both P and Q true, T I consists of the formulas P and Q. Since I is the only model of these formulas, it is causally explained according to T. The interpretation that makes both P and Q false is causally explained also. The two other interpretations of the language of T are not causally explained.
To relate the notion of a causally explained interpretation to the semantics of causal theories de ned in Section 2, let us agree to identify a set of propositional causal rules with the causal theory which consists of these rules and in which every propositional constant is explainable. For instance, we will consider the rules (16) as the rules of the propositional causal theory T in which both P and Q are explainable.
Proposition 3. For any set T of propositional causal rules and any interpretation I, I
is causally explained according to T i I is a model of T.
For instance, the two intepretations that are causally explained according to (16) are the models of P Q.
As a corollary, we conclude that the consequences of a set of propositional causal rules as de ned by McCain and Turner are the same as its consequences in the sense of Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let F i (P) G i (P) (i = 1; : : :) be the rules of T, where P is the list of all propositional constants. Then (2) is 8p(T (p) p = P);
where T (p) stands for V i (G i (P) F i (p)). Take an interpretation I, and letÎ(P) be the conjunction of all literals satis ed by I. It is clear that I is a model of T i the formulâ I(P)^8p(T (p) p = P)
is satis able. In the presence ofÎ(P), T (p) can be replaced by T I (p), where T I (P) is the conjunction of all formulas in T I , and p = P can be replaced byÎ(p). Consequently, I is a model of T i the formulaÎ (P)^8p(T I (p) Î (p)) (17) is satis able. Since the rst conjunctive termÎ(P) is satis able and the second conjunctive term 8p(T I (p) Î (p)) (18) does not contain any nonlogical constants, (17) is satis able i (18) is logically valid. Furthermore, the logical validity of (18) is equivalent to the logical validity of T I (P) Î (P): This formula is logically valid i I satis es T I (P).
